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This article introduces new software, the games package, for estimating strategic statis-
tical models in R. In these models, the probability distribution over outcomes corresponds
to the equilibrium of an underlying game form. We review such models and provide deriva-
tions for one example, including discussion of alternative motivations for the stochastic
component of the models. We introduce the basic functionality of the games package,
such as how to estimate players’ utilities for outcomes as a function of covariates. The
package implements maximum likelihood estimation for the most commonly used models
of strategic choice, including three extensive form games and an ultimatum bargaining
model. The software also includes functions for bootstrapping, plotting fitted values with
their confidence intervals, performing non-nested model comparisons, and checking global
convergence failures. We use the new software to replicate Leblang’s (2003) analysis of
speculative currency attacks.
Keywords: random utility models, structural estimation, game theory, econometrics, political
science.
1. Introduction
The games package provides functions for estimating extensive form models of strategic inter-
action in the R language (R Core Team 2013). These are random-utility models of choices by
multiple agents, each of whom conditions his or her actions on the likely decisions of the other
players. In these models, the distribution of outcomes is determined by the equilibrium of the
underlying game. The goal is to estimate how the players’ utility for each possible outcome
varies as a function of observed variables. These models are appropriate for situations where
the ultimate outcome following one actor’s choice depends on actions taken by another, which
are common in social science. In such cases, standard estimators like binary-choice regression
or Heckman selection models will lead to incorrect inferences (Signorino 1999, 2002; Signorino
and Yilmaz 2003). The games package currently implements full information maximum like-
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lihood estimation functions for four models of strategic choice:
 egame12, a discrete extensive form game with two players and three terminal nodes.
 egame122, a discrete extensive form game with two players and four terminal nodes.
 egame123, a discrete extensive form game with three players and four terminal nodes.
 ultimatum, the ultimatum bargaining game.
The package also provides various post-estimation functions, including convergence checks,
plotting of fitted values, and non-nested model comparison tests.
The models available in the games package include those that have been used most widely
in the analysis of strategic interaction within the political science literature. The egame12
model, in which there are two players and three possible outcomes, has been used to analyze
speculative attacks in currency markets (Leblang 2003), deterrence of international conflict
(Signorino and Tarar 2006), the efficacy of economic sanctions (McLean and Whang 2010),
and Latin American governmental crises (Helmke 2010). The egame122 model, with two
players and four possible outcomes, has been applied to data on candidate entry into U.S.
Congressional races (Carson 2003, 2005), appeals court decisions (Randazzo 2008), and coali-
tion formation between lobbyists (Holyoke 2009). The ultimatum bargaining model has been
used to analyze lab experiments of the ultimatum game (Ramsay and Signorino 2009) and
bargaining between rulers and subjects over war mobilization (Kedziora 2012).
All of the models implemented in the games package are recursive, sequential move games
with finite time horizons. As such, they represent one part of a broader literature on statis-
tical modeling of competitive behavior. Much of the earliest econometric work in this area
focused on static games with simultaneous moves, with applications to labor force partici-
pation and market entry (Bjorn and Vuong 1984; Bresnahan and Reiss 1991; Berry 1992).
More recent work on static games has focused on semiparametric estimation via iterative
methods (Aradillas-Lopez 2010; Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov 2010). Similar tech-
niques have been developed to estimate the parameters of dynamic games from observed data
(Hotz and Miller 1993; Aguirregabiria and Mira 2002; Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry 2007; Pe-
sendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler 2008). Another important area of the econometric literature
on strategic interaction is the estimation of auction models. These techniques use bid data
to estimate features of the distribution of private valuations of the goods being auctioned
(Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong 1995; Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong 2000; Bajari and Hortaçsu
2005). To be clear, the games package currently provides statistical tools for estimating re-
cursive, sequential games, and not simultaneous move games or dynamic games with infinite
time horizons.
Estimation of discrete strategic models was previously implemented as the program Strat
(Signorino 2003a) using the GAUSS programming language (Aptech Systems, Inc. 2006).
The games package provides new models and additional post-estimation functionality over
that available in Strat, and it is implemented in the popular R language. For analysis of
other models with a recursive structure, Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2007) provide a multi-
stage method similar to Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimator for selection models. This
method, statistical backward induction (SBI), uses only logistic or probit regression and can be
easily implemented in virtually any statistical software. However, like the Heckman two-step
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estimator, statistical backward induction is inefficient relative to full information maximum
likelihood. The purpose of the games package is to provide efficient maximum likelihood
estimation for the most common extensive-form models of strategic choice.
Section 2 of this paper provides a brief introduction to strategic statistical models, including
a derivation of a simple example. Section 3 discusses the details of their implementation in
the games package (Signorino and Kenkel 2014) and provides a replication of Leblang (2003).
The post-estimation functionality is covered in Section 4. Package games is available from
the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) at http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=
games.
2. Strategic statistical models
Every strategic statistical model is associated with a game form and solution concept. First,
the structure of the interaction must be known: the number of players, the order in which
they move, the number of actions each has available, and the possible outcomes. The purpose
is to estimate players’ utilities for each outcome, usually as a function of covariates, from data
on observed outcomes of the game being played. This requires the introduction of a stochastic
component, so that there is a non-degenerate probability distribution over outcomes for any
given set of coefficients (i.e., those on the covariates describing players’ utilities). In particular,
we will specify where error enters the model and calculate the equilibrium outcome for each
given set of parameters and stochastic shocks, using the appropriate solution concept for
the assumed stochastic structure (see below). The probability of each outcome can then be
obtained by assuming a distribution for the error terms.
The choice of stochastic structure is crucial for the estimation and interpretation of utility
parameters. The games package implements methods for two cases:
Agent error: Each player’s utility over outcomes is fixed and common knowledge. However,
there are perceptual or implementation errors that can lead to a player not choosing
the action that maximizes her expected utility calculated in terms of the outcome pay-
offs. This can be represented as a shock αmj to Player m’s expected utility for taking
action j, where the shock is realized immediately before m makes her action choice
(and hence is unknown to the preceding players). We typically assume that each αmj is
drawn independently from a normal or logistic distribution. The solution concept under
agent error is quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998), wherein each
player anticipates the probability of “mistakes” by others and adjusts her expectations
accordingly.
Private information: There is a different stochastic shock to each player’s utility for each
outcome. We will write this as πmk, for Player m and outcome k. The key assumption is
that each player fully knows her utility for each outcome, but only knows the distribution
of the shocks to the other players’ outcome utilities. The solution concept in this
case is perfect Bayesian equilibrium: each player takes the action that gives her the
highest expected utility, with respect to the realized shocks to her preferences and her
expectations about the actions the other players will take. Whereas the distribution over
outcomes was induced by the possibility of wrong decisions in the agent error case, now
it comes from the fact that observationally indistinguishable players may have different
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(b) Game with private information.
Figure 1: Game trees for the egame12 model.
privately known preferences. Except in the statistical ultimatum model, we will assume
that each πmk is drawn from a normal distribution.
We illustrate both of these stochastic structures in the egame12 example below. It is important
to recognize that different assumptions about the form of the error correspond to distinct
statistical models, and thus may yield different results. Users of the games package should
select the form of error with care, taking into account which set of assumptions best fits their
application. The implications of different error structures for strategic models are discussed
in detail in Signorino (2003b).
2.1. Illustration: The egame12 model
The egame12 model, with two players and three possible outcomes, is the simplest strategic
model. The players are indexed m = 1, 2, and each has an action set am = {L,R}. The
outcomes are indexed Y = 1, 3, 4. The structure of the interaction is as follows:
1. Player 1 chooses his action a1. If a1 = L, the game ends and the outcome is Y = 1.
Otherwise, if a1 = R, Player 2 gets to move.
2. Player 2 chooses her action a2. If a2 = L, the outcome is Y = 3; if a2 = R, the outcome
is Y = 4.
These are illustrated in the game trees in Figure 1. Let p1 and p2 denote the action prob-
abilities for Player 1, where p1 = P(a1 = L) and p2 = P(a2 = R). Let Player 2’s ac-
tion probabilities, conditional on 2’s move being reached, be p3 = P(a2 = L|a1 = R) and
p4 = P(a2 = R|a1 = R).
Each player’s utility depends on the outcome of the game; utility to Player m for outcome
k ∈ {1, 3, 4} is denoted Umk. When estimating this game, we usually model each of these
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utilities as a linear function of known covariates, Umk = x
>
mkβmk, with the goal of estimating
the coefficients βmk. Each player chooses her action a ∈ {L,R} to maximize her expected
utility, EUm(a). Since Player 2 moves last, her expected utilities are simply EU2(L) = U23
and EU2(R) = U24. Similarly, since the action a1 = L is a game-ending move, Player 1’s
expected utility from this is EU1(L) = U11. However, Player 1’s expected utility from the
action R depends on Player 2’s choice, so we have EU1(R) = p3U13 + p4U14.
We observe N plays of the game, each with realized outcome Yi and associated regressors xmki
for each player m and outcome k. Our goal is to estimate β = (βmk)m∈{1,2},k∈{1,3,4}, the set
of coefficients describing players’ utilities for particular outcomes, via maximum likelihood.
Once we assume a stochastic structure (agent error or private information), we can calculate
the observation-wise choice probabilities p1i, . . . , p4i for any β. The log-likelihood is then






(log p2i + log p3i) +
∑
i:Yi=4
(log p2i + log p4i). (1)
The calculation of these choice probabilities is the subject of the following subsections.
Agent error
Consider observation i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and assume that each player receives a stochastic shock
αmji to her expected utility for choosing j ∈ {L,R}, where each αmji is drawn independently
from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2.1 To solve for the quantal response
equilibrium of the game, we will proceed via backward induction, solving for Player 2’s choice
probabilities in order to find Player 1’s.
If Player 2’s turn is reached, her choice determines the outcome for sure. We thus have
EU2i(L) = U23i = x
>
23iβ23 and EU2i(R) = U24i = x
>
24iβ24. The ex ante probability that Player
2 chooses R is
p4i = P[EU2i(R) + α2Ri ≥ EU2i(L) + α2Li]










where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF). Since Player 2
must choose from L or R, we have p3i = 1 − p4i. We now can solve for Player 1’s choice
probabilities. If Player 1’s action is L, the outcome is Yi = 1 for certain. However, if he
chooses R, the outcome is a lottery over outcomes 3 and 4, with probabilities p3i and p4i
respectively. Since Player 1 also receives a shock to his expected utilities by action, his ex
ante chance of choosing R is
p2i = P[EU1i(R) + α1Ri ≥ EU1i(L) + α1Li]














Because Player 1 must choose L or R, we have p1i = 1− p2i. We can then estimate the agent
error model for a given dataset by substituting Equations 2 and 3 into the log-likelihood
function, Equation 1.
1The same calculations as follow can be applied in the case of errors with logistic distributions.
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As in standard binary dependent variable models (e.g., generalized linear models (GLMs)
with a logit or probit link), the statistical model is not identified with respect to the scale
parameter σ, so it cannot be estimated (Signorino 1999; Lewis and Schultz 2003). The scale
parameter is fixed to σ = 1 in all of the extensive-form models in the games package, so that
each estimated utility coefficient β̂mkj can be interpreted as an estimate of the ratio βmjk/σ.
Alternatively, we allow for σ to be modeled as a function of covariates, in which case the
regression coefficients for these variables can be estimated. For details, see the example in
Section 3.3.
Private information
Assume there is an additive shock πmki to each outcome utility Umki, where each πmki is
drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. We will again
proceed by backward induction, this time to solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Player 2 will choose R if and only if U24i + π24i ≥ U23i + π23i. The ex ante probability of
Player 2 choosing R is therefore
p4i = P[U24i + π24i ≥ U23i + π23i]










As before, p3i = 1− p4i. We can now write Player 1’s expected utility for choosing R in the
private information case as
EU1i(R) = p3i(x
>
13iβ13 + π13i) + p4i(x
>
14iβ14 + π14i).
The ex ante probability of Player 1 selecting R is
p2i = P[EU1i(R) ≥ EU1i(L)]
= P[p3i(x
>
13iβ13 + π13i) + p4i(x
>
14iβ14 + π14i) ≥ x>11iβ11 + π11i]
= P[π11i − p3iπ13i − p4iπ14i ≤ p3ix>13iβ13 + p4ix>14iβ14 − x>11iβ11]
= Φ
p3ix>13iβ13 + p4ix>14iβ14 − x>11iβ11
σ
√





Then, as in the agent error case, we can estimate the model by letting p1i = 1 − p2i and
substituting Equations 4 and 5 into the log-likelihood function, Equation 1. As before, for
identification we must either set σ = 1 or model σ as a function of regressors.
The agent error and private information models are very similar, but not observationally
equivalent. Equations 2 and 4 are identical, so the action probabilities for Player 2 are the
same under either model (holding fixed β). However, the expressions for Player 1’s choice
probabilities, Equations 3 and 5, are slightly different. In the agent error case, the choice
probability for Player 1 depends on the difference in expected utility shocks, α1Li − α1Ri,
which is identically distributed across observations i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In the private information
model, the probability depends on the difference of the weighted outcome utility shocks,
π11i − p3iπ13i − p4iπ14i. This is normally distributed with mean 0 regardless of the values
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4i and thus may vary across observations. In
particular, the variance is least when p3i = p4i = 0.5 and greatest when p3i = 1 or p4i = 1. In
practice, this does not make for a major difference, and the two models usually yield similar
estimates of β.
2.2. Identification of model parameters
Lewis and Schultz (2003) provide a necessary condition for identification in discrete-choice
strategic models: no regressor, including the constant, may appear in all of a player’s utility
equations for the outcomes reachable after her move. All of the fitting functions in the games
package enforce this condition. One way to accomplish it is to fix each player’s utility to
0 for one outcome. This comes without loss of generality, since Von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities are unique only up to a positive affine transformation.
The necessary condition is sufficient if there is enough variation in the regressor and outcome
data. As an example of insufficient variation in the regressors, consider the egame12 model
with:
U11i = β110 + β111xi,
U13i = 0,
U14i = β140 + β141xi,
U23i = 0,
U24i = β240,
where x is a binary covariate. This specification meets the necessary condition, since U13 and
U23 are both fixed to 0. We have that p4i = Φ(β240/
√
2) ≡ p4 for all i. Let b be any real
















It is easily verified from Equations 2 and 3 (for the agent error model) or Equations 4 and 5 (for
the private information model) that the choice probabilities are the same for all observations
under β and β̃. The two sets of parameters are thus observationally equivalent, so the model
parameters are not identified. This kind of identification problem is averted if there is at least
one continuous covariate included in the model, as then xi 6= xj for all distinct observations
i, j. For other examples of identification failure due to insufficient variation in the covariates,
see Lewis and Schultz (2003).
The other identification problem that may arise is separation, a common issue in models of
discrete choice (Albert and Anderson 1984). For example, in the egame12 model, suppose
there is a covariate xj (or more generally a linear combination of covariates) that enters Player
2’s utility such that
a2i =
{
L xji ≤ x̂,
R xji > x̂
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for some critical value x̂. Then, as in ordinary logistic or probit regression models, maximum
likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the parameters associated with this covariate do not exist.
In practice, the fitting procedure will tend toward infinity and typically fail to converge.
This condition is trivially true if one of the outcomes of a model is not observed, so another
necessary condition for existence of an MLE is that each outcome be observed at least once
in the data.
In addition to these global identifiability issues, there is also the possibility that a numerical
maximization procedure will stop at a point that is not a strict local maximum (e.g., a saddle
point or a flat spot in the likelihood function). A sufficient condition for an estimate β̂ to be a
strict local maximum is that the Hessian matrix be negative definite at β̂; all fitting functions
in the games package issue a warning if the result does not satisfy this condition.
2.3. The statistical ultimatum model
The ultimatum game is a workhorse model of bargaining in economics and in political science,
in which one player makes a “take it or leave it” offer to the other. The equilibrium size of
an offer depends on the proposer’s expectations about what will be accepted, which standard
models like ordinary least squares (OLS) fail to account for. To facilitate analysis of bargaining
data, we implement the statistical ultimatum game of Ramsay and Signorino (2009) via the
ultimatum function. The structure of the game is:
1. Player 1 makes an offer y ∈ [M,Q] to Player 2.
2. Player 2 can accept or reject the offer.
(a) If accepted, payoffs are Q− y for Player 1 and y for Player 2.
(b) If rejected, payoffs are R1 + ε1 and R2 + ε2 respectively, where ε1, ε2 are i.i.d.
logistic variables with scale parameters s1 and s2. The reservations Rm are common
knowledge, but the realized stochastic terms εm are privately known by the players.
In applications, the reservation values are modeled as a function of covariates, Rmi = x
>
miβm,
and the goal is to estimate β1, β2, s1, and s2. For example, experimental economists have
investigated whether there are cross-cultural differences in play of the ultimatum game in lab
settings; e.g., if Americans make systematically lower offers (see Botelho, Harrison, Hirsch,
and Rutström 2005). To test this, one would include an indicator for nationality in the
equations for the players’ reservation values.
The log-likelihood of the ultimatum model can be derived as follows (for full details, see
Ramsay and Signorino 2009). First, the probability that Player 2 accepts a given offer y is
P(accept | y) = P(y ≥ R2 + ε2)
= P(ε2 ≤ y −R2)
= Λ(y − x>2 β2; s2),
where Λ(·; s) is the logistic CDF with scale parameter s. We can then characterize y∗ = h(ε1),




P(accept | y) · (Q− y) + (1− P(accept | y)) · (R1 + ε1).
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After differentiating and rearranging, we yield the implicit definition
y∗ = Q− x>1 β1 − ε1 −
Λ(y∗ − x>2 β2; s2)
λ(y∗ − x>2 β2; s2)






where λ(·; s) is the logistic probability density function (PDF) with scale parameter s. Finally,







































Due to the constraint that offers must be between M and Q, the observed offer will be y = M
if y∗ < M and y = Q if y∗ > Q. Letting δi be an indicator for whether the offer was accepted
in observation i, we yield the log-likelihood

















The main criterion for identification in the statistical ultimatum game is the usual condition
that the variables within each xm be linearly independent; otherwise, the corresponding βm is
unidentified. Unlike in most discrete-choice models, the scale parameters s1 and s2 are indi-
vidually identified in the ultimatum model. This is a consequence of the shared observability
of the offer y (see Ramsay and Signorino 2009). In small samples, however, estimation of s2
may cause numerical difficulties; when this occurs, users may instead treat its value as fixed.
3. Specification and estimation
In this section and those below, we replicate Leblang’s (2003) analysis of speculative currency
attacks to illustrate the package’s functionality. The dataset is available in package games as
leblang2003.
R> library("games")
R> data("leblang2003", package = "games")
R> names(leblang2003)
[1] "outcome" "preelec" "postelec" "rightgov"
[5] "unifgov" "lreserves" "realinterest" "lexports"
[9] "capcont" "overval" "creditgrow" "service"
[13] "USinterest" "contagion" "prioratt" "nation"
[17] "month" "year"
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Each observation is a country observed in a particular year. The assumed data-generating
process follows the egame12 model, with two players and three potential outcomes. Player 1
is “the market,” which decides whether or not to initiate a speculative attack on Player 2’s
(the country’s) currency. If the market decides not to attack, the game ends. If there is an
attack, the country decides whether to devalue the currency or defend its exchange-rate peg.
The observed distribution of outcomes is:
R> table(leblang2003$outcome)
no attack devaluation defense
7152 42 46
We assume that the market is strategic, incorporating its expectations of the country’s re-
sponse into its initial decision of whether to make a currency attack. The source of uncertainty
is assumed to be private information about payoffs, which yields outcome probabilities given
by Equations 4 and 5. The market’s utility for the three possible outcomes, and each country’s
utility for defending the currency, is assumed to be a linear function of observed covariates.
For identification, the country’s utility for devaluation is fixed to 0.2 See the original paper
or the help page for leblang2003 for information on the covariates and specific assignments
to each utility equation.
3.1. Modeling player utilities
The typical use of a strategic model is to estimate the effect of observed factors on players’
utility for each possible outcome. To avoid an overabundance of parameters and potential
inefficiency, analysts will typically want to make some exclusion restrictions – i.e., to leave
some regressors out of some utility equations. This necessitates the use of multiple model
formulas, which we handle via the Formula package (Zeileis and Croissant 2010). The variables
to include in each utility are specified using the standard formula syntax, and each set is
separated by a vertical bar (|). For example, in the egame12 model, an analyst may want to
use the specification
U11 = β11,0 + β11,1x1,
U13 = 0,
U14 = β14,0 + β14,1x1 + β14,2x2,
U24 = β24,0 + β24,2x2,
where x1 and x2 are observed variables. The appropriate Formula syntax is y ~ x1 | 0 |
x1 + x2 | x2.
In some of the more complex models, such as egame123 with its eight utility equations, writing
the model formulas manually may be daunting or prone to error. We provide two options to
ease the process. First, users may specify the model formulas as a list; the fitting functions
then use the internal function checkFormulas to convert it to the appropriate Formula object.
R> f1 <- list(u11 = y ~ x1, u13 = ~ 0, u14 = ~ x1 + x2, u24 = ~ x2)
R> games:::checkFormulas(f1)
2In the original study, Leblang estimates a constant for Player 2’s utility from devaluation and leaves a
constant out of utility for defense. Our approach here yields substantively identical results.
Journal of Statistical Software 11
y ~ x1 | 0 | x1 + x2 | x2
(Elements of the list need not be named; in fact, the names are ignored.) Second, the function
makeFormulas provides interactive prompts for constructing the model formulas step by step.
The user only needs to supply the name of the model he or she intends to fit and a character
vector containing outcome descriptions. For the Leblang data, the appropriate call would look
like makeFormulas(egame12, outcomes = c("no attack", "devaluation", "defense")).
The following menu will appear at the R console:
Equation for player 1's utility from no attack:
1: fix to 0
2: intercept only
3: regressors, no intercept
4: regressors with intercept
Selection:
If 3 or 4 is selected, the user will be prompted to enter a space-separated list of variables to
include in the utility equation of interest. We use functions from stringr (Wickham 2010)
in parsing the input. The same menu will then be displayed for Player 1’s utility from
devaluation, Player 1’s utility from defense, and Player 2’s utility from defense. The final
prompt will ask for the name of the variable (or variables; see Section 3.2 below) containing
information on the observed outcomes. The function will then return the Formula specification
corresponding to the given input, which can be supplied as the formulas argument of the
appropriate fitting function.
3.2. Dependent variable specification
For most of the models included in the games package, there are a few different ways that
the dependent variable might be stored in the dataset. For example, all of the following are
plausible representations of the outcome variable in the Leblang data:
 Numeric indicators for the final outcome, where 1 means no currency attack, 2 means
devaluation in response to an attack, and 3 means defense against an attack.
 Factor indicators for the final outcome, where the levels correspond to no attack, deval-
uation, and defense respectively.
 Binary variables representing each player’s action. The first would be coded 0 when
there is no attack and 1 when there is an attack. The second would be coded 0 when
the targeted country devalues and 1 when it defends the currency peg.
The games package allows for all of these types of specifications. To use a numeric or factor
indicator for the final outcome, the form of the specification is simply y ~ ., as in typical
model formulas. To use binary indicators, the names of the indicators should be separated with
+ signs on the left-hand side, as in y1 + y2 ~ .. When using binary indicators, unobserved
outcomes – in this case, the value of y2 when y1 == 0 – should not be coded as NAs, as this
will typically result in their being removed from the dataset.
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The method of specifying the dependent variable has no effect on the estimation results, as
shown in the next example.
R> leblang2003$attack <- as.numeric(leblang2003$outcome != "no attack")
R> leblang2003$defend <- as.numeric(leblang2003$outcome == "defense")
R> flb <- outcome ~ capcont + lreserves + overval + creditgrow + USinterest +
+ service + contagion + prioratt - 1 | 1 | 1 | unifgov + lexports +
+ preelec + postelec + rightgov + realinterest + capcont + lreserves
R> flb1 <- as.Formula(flb)
R> flb2 <- update(flb1, attack + defend ~ .)
R> leb1 <- egame12(flb1, data = leblang2003, link = "probit",
+ type = "private")
R> leb2 <- egame12(flb2, data = leblang2003, link = "probit",
+ type = "private")
R> all.equal(coef(leb1), coef(leb2), check.attributes = FALSE)
[1] TRUE
The only difference is in the construction of the names of the utility equations. When binary
action indicators are used, the outcome names are inferred from the names of the action








The methods for specifying the dependent variable differ slightly across models; see the help
page of each fitting function for a list of allowable specifications.
3.3. Model fitting
Once the formula has been constructed, it is straightforward to fit a strategic model. All of
the fitting functions contain the arguments data, subset, and na.action, which are used in
the typical way to construct the model frame. In addition, the method argument is passed to
maxLik (from the maxLik package; Henningsen and Toomet 2011) to select an optimization
routine, and other parameters to control the process (e.g., reltol, iterlim) can be passed
as named arguments.
Each fitting function returns an object inheriting from two S3 classes. The first is the ‘game’
class, for which most of the methods of interest are defined, including print and summary.
The second is the name of the particular model that was fit; this is used by the predict
methods. For the most part, the elements of a ‘game’ object are the same as those of ‘lm’ and
‘glm’ objects (e.g., coefficients, vcov). Pertinent differences include:
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 The log.likelihood element contains the vector of the n observationwise log-likelihoods
evaluated at the parameter estimate, for use in non-nested model tests (see Section 4.2
below).
 The y element contains the outcome variable represented as a factor whose levels are
the outcome names.
 The link and type elements store the link function and source of error respectively.
 The equations element contains the names of the utility equations and scale terms; this
is used by the print method for ‘game’ objects and latexTable to group the parameters
estimated.
Fitted ultimatum models contain some additional elements, which are discussed below.
The nonparametric bootstrap is implemented as part of the fitting process via the boot
argument of the model functions. To run the bootstrap on a model that has already been
estimated, use update as in the next example. A status bar is printed by default, but it can
be suppressed by setting bootreport = FALSE.
R> set.seed(42)
R> leb1 <- update(leb1, boot = 100)
Running bootstrap iterations...
========================================================================
Bootstrap results are stored in the boot.matrix element of the fitted model object. When a
model has been bootstrapped, the default behavior of the summary method for ‘game’ objects
is to use the bootstrap results to calculate standard error estimates.
R> summary(leb1)
Call:
egame12(formulas = flb1, data = leblang2003, link = "probit",
type = "private", boot = 100)
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
u1(no attack):capcont -0.4525 0.3352 -1.35 0.17710
u1(no attack):lreserves 0.2292 0.0629 3.64 0.00027
u1(no attack):overval -0.4413 0.1400 -3.15 0.00162
u1(no attack):creditgrow -0.0648 0.0380 -1.71 0.08800
u1(no attack):USinterest -0.0505 0.0507 -1.00 0.31902
u1(no attack):service -0.0288 0.0401 -0.72 0.47291
u1(no attack):contagion -0.1159 0.0435 -2.66 0.00773
u1(no attack):prioratt -0.1218 0.0457 -2.66 0.00771
u1(devaluation):(Intercept) -3.6648 0.3855 -9.51 < 2e-16
u1(defense):(Intercept) -3.1385 0.4057 -7.74 1e-14
u2(defense):(Intercept) 0.4269 1.7442 0.24 0.80663
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u2(defense):unifgov -0.3568 0.3862 -0.92 0.35559
u2(defense):lexports -0.1997 0.1891 -1.06 0.29085
u2(defense):preelec 1.6632 1.9215 0.87 0.38672
u2(defense):postelec 1.0623 0.9031 1.18 0.23947
u2(defense):rightgov -0.9358 0.5176 -1.81 0.07058
u2(defense):realinterest 1.7955 1.0693 1.68 0.09312
u2(defense):capcont 0.0656 1.7098 0.04 0.96940
u2(defense):lreserves 0.3099 0.2046 1.51 0.12985




To see the asymptotic, normal-theory standard errors instead, supply the option useboot =
FALSE to the summary call.
The other arguments for the fitting functions depend on whether the model is one of the
discrete extensive form games or the statistical ultimatum game.
Extensive-form models
The stochastic structure of the extensive-form models is specified via the arguments link
and type. The link argument is used to specify the distributional form of the error terms:
"probit" for normal, "logit" for type I extreme value. The type argument specifies whether
the source of randomness is "agent" error or "private" information. Normal errors must
be used in the case of private information; if a model is specified with link = "logit" and
type = "private", a warning will be issued and a probit link will be enforced.
The error variance σ2 normally is not estimable on its own, as noted above in Section 2. This
is no longer the case if σ is modeled as a function of known covariates:
σ = exp(γ1Z1 + γ2Z2 + . . .+ γkZk).
The argument sdformula is used to estimate γ for such a model. The formula should be
one-sided, with nothing to the left of the ~, as in the following example.
R> leb3 <- egame12(outcome ~ lreserves + overval - 1 | 1 | 1 | preelec +
+ realinterest, sdformula = ~ prioratt - 1,
+ data = leblang2003, link = "probit", type = "private")
R> summary(leb3)
Call:
egame12(formulas = outcome ~ lreserves + overval - 1 | 1 | 1 |
preelec + realinterest, data = leblang2003, link = "probit",
type = "private", sdformula = ~prioratt - 1)
Coefficients:
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Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
u1(no attack):lreserves 0.2264 0.0464 4.88 1.1e-06
u1(no attack):overval -0.4381 0.0836 -5.24 1.6e-07
u1(devaluation):(Intercept) -3.0137 0.2471 -12.19 < 2e-16
u1(defense):(Intercept) -2.8410 0.2275 -12.49 < 2e-16
u2(defense):(Intercept) -0.0190 0.1985 -0.10 0.9238
u2(defense):preelec 1.3690 0.6406 2.14 0.0326
u2(defense):realinterest 1.4943 0.5649 2.65 0.0082
log(sigma):prioratt 0.0427 0.0186 2.29 0.0221




The equation for the scale parameter coefficients is log(sigma); for models with a logit link, it
would be log(lambda). The positive coefficient on prior attacks indicates that outcomes are
less predictable (since the stochastic terms are larger relative to the systematic components)
for countries that have been victims of speculative currency attacks in the past. Note that
it is also possible to estimate separate scale-term equations for each player, by using the
argument sdByPlayer = TRUE and using an equation of the form sdformula = scale1vars
| scale2vars.
The extensive-form models also allow for estimation of the error variance when the average
payoffs are known to the analyst, such as in data from lab experiments. In this case, the
payoffs can be specified with the fixedUtils argument. The only information needed from
the model formula is the outcome variable, i.e., the formulas argument can be written in the
form y ~ . or y ~ 1. When the argument fixedUtils is used, the default behavior is to
estimate a single common scale parameter, as in the next example.
R> lebfixed <- egame12(outcome ~ ., data = leblang2003,
+ fixedUtils = c(1, -1, 0, 1), link = "probit", type = "private")
R> summary(lebfixed)
Call:
egame12(formulas = outcome ~ ., data = leblang2003, link = "probit",
type = "private", fixedUtils = c(1, -1, 0, 1))
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
log(sigma) -1.0513 0.0199 -52.9 <2e-16
Standard errors estimated from inverse Hessian
Fixed terms:
u1(no attack) u1(devaluation) u1(defense) u2(defense)
1 -1 0 1




Loosely speaking, the higher the estimated scale parameter relative to the utility values, the
greater the role of uncertainty in each player’s decisions. As before, sdByPlayer can be used
to estimate a separate scale parameter for each player, and sdformulas to specify the scale
term(s) as a function of covariates.
The ultimatum model
In the ultimatum model, each observation consists of the value of the offer made by Player
1 and whether Player 2 accepted it. By assumption, there is an exogenous upper bound
on the size of the offer, which is specified via maxOffer, and a lower bound specified via
minOffer (default 0). It is important to be able to identify which offers were at one of these
boundary points, since the log-likelihood of an observation depends on whether the offer was
interior. If offers are stored as floating-point numbers, naive equality tests may misclassify
some boundary observations as interior. To mitigate this, we use the argument offertol and
code an offer x as meeting the lower bound if x < minOffer+offertol and the upper bound
if x > maxOffer− offertol. Unless there are extremely slight differences between observed
offers, on the order of 1×10−8, the default value of offertol should suffice for most analyses.
The arguments s1 and s2 are for fixing the scale parameters of the stochastic component
of the players’ reservation values. If either of these is left unspecified, it is estimated. We
recommend fixing s2, since attempts to estimate it often run into numerical stability issues
(Ramsay and Signorino 2009).
The model formula for ultimatum should be written in the form offer + accept ~ R1 |
R2, where R1 and R2 contain the variables for Player 1’s and 2’s reservation values respectively.
Some researchers may only have access to data on offer size, but not whether the offer was
accepted. For such datasets, run ultimatum with the argument outcome = "offer" and
specify the model formula as offer ~ R1 | R2. Parameters for Player 2’s reservation value
are still estimable in this case, since the optimal offer for Player 1 depends on his or her
expectations of the probability of acceptance. Even when acceptance data are available, the
option outcome = "offer" may be useful for making formal comparisons of the statistical
ultimatum model to OLS models of offer size, as in Ramsay and Signorino (2009). For more
on model comparison, see Section 4.2 below.
We illustrate the statistical ultimatum game with data from a classroom experiment. Each
gender variable is an indicator for whether the proposer (1) or receiver (2) is female. We
investigate whether players’ reservation values – the amount they get if the offer is rejected –
is a function of their gender.
R> data("student_offers", package = "games")
R> ult1 <- ultimatum(offer + accept ~ gender1 | gender2, maxOffer = 100,
+ data = student_offers, s2 = 3)
R> summary(ult1)
Call:
ultimatum(formulas = offer + accept ~ gender1 | gender2, data = student_offers,
maxOffer = 100, s2 = 3)
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Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
R1:(Intercept) 62.198 18.734 3.32 0.0009
R1:gender1 -25.409 39.290 -0.65 0.5178
R2:(Intercept) 37.684 1.616 23.31 <2e-16
R2:gender2 -0.897 1.150 -0.78 0.4355
log(s1) 3.934 0.430 9.14 <2e-16







The results indicate that the female students have lower reservation values, meaning they are
more likely to make high offers (as the proposer) or accept low ones (as the receiver). However,
neither gender coefficient is statistically significant, so this may just be due to sampling error.
3.4. Convergence
The log-likelihood functions for strategic models are not globally concave, so convergence to a
global maximum is not guaranteed. We provide two methods to avert convergence problems:
well-chosen default starting values and a likelihood profiling method.
In all of the egame models, the default starting values come from statistical backward induction
(SBI), an equation-by-equation method that uses ordinary probit or logistic regression models
to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters (Bas et al. 2007).3 For example, in an
egame12 model with logit link, the procedure is as follows. Let Yi be an indicator for whether
Player i chooses R.
1. Obtain the estimate β̂24 by running a logistic regression of Y2 on X24 within the subset
of observations for which Y1 = 1 (i.e., Player 2’s choice is observed).
2. Estimate β̂11, β̂13, and β̂14 as follows:
(a) Use β̂24 to generate predicted probabilities p̂4 and p̂3 for Player 2’s action.











3SBI is based on the assumption of agent error, so the estimates technically are not consistent for private-
information models. However, for strategic models of relatively low complexity like those available in the
games package, the assumption of agent error or private information makes little difference to the parameter
estimates (Signorino 2003b).
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3. Multiply the obtained estimates by
√
2 to obtain starting values for the full-information
procedure.4
The applications of SBI to egame122 and egame123 are similar. It is less straightforward to
generate starting values for the ultimatum model. We use a similar two-step procedure, but
it has not been verified as consistent and sometimes yields non-finite likelihoods, in which
case starting values of zero (except for the intercept) are used.
To assess convergence of an already-fitted model, we implement likelihood profiling via the
profile method for ‘game’ objects. As in the MASS package’s (Venables and Ripley 2002)
profile method for ‘glm’ objects, this entails refitting the model numerous times, each time
holding a single parameter at some value other than the original estimate. In the case of
GLMs, this profiling procedure is typically used to estimate likelihood-ratio confidence regions
(McCullagh and Nelder 1989, p. 254). However, it can also serve as a rough global convergence
check: if the log-likelihood of any of the refitted models is greater than that of the original
fit, then by definition the original procedure did not converge to a global maximum. When
this is the case, as in the following example, the profile method applied to a ‘game’ object
issues a warning.
R> stu1 <- ultimatum(offer + accept ~ gender1 | gender2,
+ data = student_offers, maxOffer = 100, s2 = 1)




In profile.game(stu1, which = 1:4) :
some profiled fits have higher log-likelihood than original fit;
refit the model using "profile" option
The returned object, inheriting from class ‘profile.game’, contains the estimates and log-
likelihoods from each refitted model. For visualization of the profile log-likelihood, we provide
a plot method for ‘profile.game’ objects, which displays a spline approximation.
R> plot(profstu1)
See Figure 2 for the output from this example. Slightly lower values of both the intercept and
the gender coefficient for Player 1 appear to yield better-fitting models.
When the profile method for ‘game’ objects finds parameters that yield a higher log-
likelihood than the original fit, these can be used as starting values in re-estimation of the
model via the profile argument of the fitting function.
R> stu2 <- update(stu1, profile = profstu1)
R> logLik(stu1)
4This step is not necessary when SBI is used on its own, rather than to generate starting values. The
correction is for the additional dispersion induced by the agent error model. Standard logit and probit methods
assume a dispersion parameter of 1, but Equations 2 and 3 along with the assumption σ = 1 imply a dispersion
parameter of
√
2. The change makes no substantive difference for the results.
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Figure 2: Output of plot method for ‘profile.game’ objects.
'log Lik.' -663.45 (df=5)
R> logLik(stu2)
'log Lik.' -663 (df=5)
3.5. Reporting results
A natural form to present the results of a fitted strategic model is in a table where each row
is a covariate and each column is a utility equation. We provide the function latexTable to
automatically generate LATEX code for such tables. Table 1 was generated with the following
code:
R> leb1cap <- paste("Replication of \\citeauthor{Leblang2003}'s",
+ "\\citeyearpar{Leblang2003} results.")
R> latexTable(leb1, caption = leb1cap, label = "tab:leb1", floatplace = "p")
Additional arguments include digits for the number of digits printed, rowsep for the point
spacing between rows, and useboot for the use of bootstrap vs. normal-theory standard errors.
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Table 1: Replication of Leblang’s (2003) results.
4. Analyzing fitted models
4.1. Predicted probabilities
The raw output from the model fitting functions in package games describes the effect of
each covariate on players’ utilities for different outcomes. Some analysts may instead be
interested in how each variable affects the probability of a particular outcome occurring.
Such probabilities are nonlinear functions of the covariates; for example, they are given by
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Figure 3: Output of plot method for ‘predProbs’ objects.
Equations 2 and 3 for egame12 models with agent error. Following popular developments in
the political science literature (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), we provide the function
predProbs to analyze how the predicted probability of each outcome changes as a function
of certain covariates. The general procedure is:
1. Select a “covariate of interest,”Xj .
2. Hold all other variables at their central values – means for continuous variables, medians
for binary or ordinal variables, modes for others – or some other pre-specified “profile”
X−j = (Xj′)j′ 6=j .
3. Using the estimated model, find the predicted probability of each potential outcome
over the observed range of Xj , while holding X−j fixed.
4. Calculate confidence intervals for the predicted values using a parametric or nonpara-
metric bootstrap.
5. Plot the results.
The only mandatory arguments for predProbs are model, for the fitted model object, and
x, a character string containing the name of the variable of interest (partial matches are
allowed). If x is numeric, then the default behavior is to evaluate predicted probabilities at
100 grid points along the range observed for x in the data used to fit the model (i.e., the data
frame model$model). The number of grid points and range of values can be controlled via
the arguments n and xlim respectively. If x is a factor variable, all available levels are used.
Additional named arguments can be used to change the default profile of values for the
covariates other than x. These arguments should be specified as varname = value, where
varname exactly matches the name of the variable in the data frame used to fit the model and
value is an expression that is evaluated within the model frame, model$model. For example,
to set a variable y to its observed 10th percentile, use the argument y = quantile(y, probs
= 0.1).
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Confidence intervals for the predictions are calculated by resampling. If model has a
boot.matrix element containing nonparametric bootstrap results, these are used. Other-
wise, a matrix of parametric bootstrap results is constructed by taking 1,000 samples from a
multivariate normal distribution whose mean is β̂ and whose variance matrix is the inverse of
the negative Hessian of the estimates. The default is to compute a 95% confidence interval;
this can be controlled by the ci argument. It normally takes a few seconds to compute the
fitted values for all of the bootstrapped coefficients, so a status bar is displayed. This can be
suppressed by setting report = FALSE.
We illustrate with an example from Leblang’s data. Suppose we are interested in the estimated
effect of currency reserves on the outcome probabilities when contagion is high (currency
attacks are occurring elsewhere) but all other variables are held at their central values. We
would use predProbs as follows.
R> predleb1 <- predProbs(leb1, x = "lreserves", contagion = max(contagion))
Calculating confidence intervals...
========================================================================
The return value is an object inheriting from classes ‘predProbs’ and ‘data.frame’. This
is a data frame with n (or nlevels(x), if x is a factor) rows, each containing a profile,
the predicted probabilities for each outcome, and the confidence bands on each predicted
probability.
The plot method for ‘predProbs’ objects can be used for visualization of the output. The
number of plots that can be produced from predProbs output is equal to the number of
outcomes in the corresponding fitted model (e.g., three for an egame12 model). To deal with
this, we have written the plot method for ‘predProbs’ objects to behave similarly to the
plot method for ‘gam’ objects in the gam package (Hastie 2011), in which each fitted model
corresponds to as many plots as there are covariates.
R> par(mfrow = c(2, 2))
R> plot(predleb1)
See Figure 3 for the output. If no additional arguments are specified to plot(x), where x is a
‘predProbs’ object, all of the plots are printed in sequence. If ask = TRUE is specified, then
an interactive menu is used for plot selection:
R> plot(predleb1, ask = TRUE)
Make a plot selection (or 0 to exit):
1: plot: Pr(no attack)
2: plot: Pr(devaluation)
3: plot: Pr(defense)
4: plot all terms
The argument which can be used to select one of these without bringing up the menu; e.g.,
plot(predleb1, which = 2) will produce only the plot for the devaluation outcome. In each
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case, all of the standard plotting arguments can be used to control the output. To change the
line type used for the confidence bands, use the argument lty.ci.
4.2. Non-nested model comparisons
It is not possible to express traditional discrete-choice models like logistic regression as “re-
stricted”strategic models, or vice versa. Therefore, standard likelihood ratio tests are inappro-
priate for comparing the fit of a strategic model to that of a GLM; a non-nested model compar-
ison is necessary (Clarke and Signorino 2010). The games package implements Vuong’s (1989)
test for strictly nonnested models and Clarke’s (2006) distribution-free test via the vuong and
clarke functions respectively. Each test compares two models, under the null hypothesis
that the two have an equal Kullback-Leibler distance from the true model. Both use test
statistics formed from the log-likelihood contributions of each individual observation. The
main difference is that Clarke’s test has greater power in small samples, whereas Vuong’s de-
pends on asymptotic properties. We implement both tests with the recommended BIC-based
correction to penalize overparameterization.
The simplest use of the non-nested test functions is to compare two strategic models to each
other. For example, we can use them to determine whether agent error or private information
is more appropriate for Leblang’s data.
R> lebagent <- update(leb1, type = "agent", boot = 0)
R> vuong(leb1, lebagent)
Vuong test for non-nested models
Model 1 log-likelihood: -482
Model 2 log-likelihood: -482
Observations: 7240
Test statistic: -0.15
Neither model is significantly preferred (p = 0.88)
Neither stochastic structure appears to be significantly preferred over the other.
It is somewhat less straightforward to compare strategic to non-strategic models. Vuong’s and
Clarke’s tests can be applied only to pairs of models for which the dependent variable is exactly
the same. In a strategic model like egame12, the dependent variable for each observation is
the outcome reached – i.e., the vector of all decisions made by each player. By contrast,
in a standard (binary) logistic regression model, the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether one particular outcome was reached. To allow for comparisons in such cases, the
vuong and clarke functions have outcome arguments. For example, we could compare the
strategic model of Leblang’s data to a logistic regression in terms of their ability to predict
the occurrence of speculative attacks as follows.
R> leblang2003$noattack <- 1 - leblang2003$attack
R> logit1 <- glm(noattack ~ lreserves + overval + creditgrow +
+ contagion + prioratt + rightgov + realinterest,
+ data = leblang2003, family = binomial)
R> vuong(model1 = leb1, outcome1 = 1, model2 = logit1)
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Vuong test for non-nested models
Model 1 log-likelihood: -430
Model 2 log-likelihood: -431
Observations: 7240
Test statistic: -9.8
Model 2 is preferred (p < 2e-16)
The logistic regression is preferred despite having a lower log-likelihood, since it fits 8 param-
eters compared to the strategic model’s 19. The argument outcome1 = 1 is used to indicate
that the strategic model should be evaluated in terms of its fit with the market’s decision not
to initiate a currency attack. We would have used outcome1 = 2 to consider the outcome
of a speculative attack followed by devaluation, and outcome1 = 3 for an attack followed by
defense. Of course, these could not have been compared to logit1, and vuong or clarke
would stop with an error after detecting models with different dependent variables.
5. Conclusion
We have provided new software, the games package, for estimating strategic statistical models
in R. Such models are appropriate for the analysis of data where multiple agents make decisions
sequentially and where the agents’ expectations of each other’s actions determine their choices.
The new software implements multiple strategic models, including a statistical bargaining
game. The software is easy to use and includes post-estimation features such as non-nested
comparison tests and plots of fitted values with measures of uncertainty. We show that the
software can be used to easily replicate one well-known analysis of a strategic statistical model
(Leblang 2003).
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